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Constituency service in Turkey: a survey on MPs 
Yasushi Hazama 
 
Abstract. This paper explores some causes and the consequences of 
constituency service in a proportional representational system. Turkey 
provides an interesting case here. First, its province-size constituencies 
generate a significant size of personal votes for a candidate, though 
nominated in the party list. Second, as in other non-western democracies, it 
is the service and allocational aspects of responsiveness that compose the 
most frequent demands from constituents to parliamentarians in Turkey. 
There exists, however, conflicting evidence regarding what priority Turkish 
parliamentarians give to constituency service. The analysis of the data 
collected through a questionnaire survey highlights several features of 
constituency service in Turkey. First, in terms of daily activities, 
parliamentarians spend for constituency service the largest part of their 
time at their own disposal. Second, for reelection purposes, 
parliamentarians consider their individual activities to be almost as 
important as party popularity. Third, the demand for and supply of 
constituency service depend on different politico-economic structures of the 
constituency. The smaller the constituency size, the larger will be the 
demand for and the supply of constituency service. The economically less 
developed constituencies tend to generate more demand than the more 
developed constituencies but do not significantly motivate the 
parliamentarians to provide constituency service. In addition, the Turkish 
parliamentarian’s turnover rate is much higher than in other democratic 
countries. Therefore even reelected parliamentarians have to take 
constituency service seriously. The statistical test shows no significant 
difference in the practices of constituency service between newly-elected 
and reelected parliamentarians. 
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Public support to the legislature, which is one of the two keys for an institutionalized 
legislature, largely depends on the effectiveness of representation. Representation has been 
generally understood to encompass 1) policy responsiveness, 2) service responsiveness, 3) 
allocation responsiveness, and 4) symbolic responsiveness. Traditionally, most of the literature on 
representation has been devoted to policy responsiveness. It was not until the late 1970s that the 
service and allocation aspects of representation especially in single-member constituencies came to 
receive attention in the literature (Cain et al. 1984, Jewell 1985, Cain et al. 1987, Norton et al. 1993).  
[2] The service and allocational aspects of representation should be also important for some 
plural-member constituencies for at least two reasons. First, proportional representational systems, 
which require the electorates to vote for a party, do not encourage representatives to establish closer 
ties with their constituents than majoritarian electoral systems do. If a proportional-representation 
system assumes relatively small constituencies, however, connections between representatives and 
constituents will be closer. This is because voters can easily recognize the few candidates in the 
party list and also because representatives find it geographically easier than in large-sized 
constituencies, to reach constituents. Second, for non- Western countries it has been argued that the 
service and allocational aspects of responsiveness constituted the most important functions of their 
legislatures (Mezey 1979, Jewel 1985). 
[3] This paper1, based on a questionnaire, surveys some causes and consequences of 
constituency service in a proportional representational system. Turkey provides an interesting case 
here since, first of all, its province-size (at largest) constituencies, which ranged from two-member to 
six-member (See Appendix I), bring the personal as well as the partisan variable into electoral 
                                                 
1 The author would like to express his deep appreciation to all the parliamentarians who spared their precious 
time to respond to the questionnaire. In particular, Ercan Karakaş, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the 
SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) ; İstemihan Talay, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the CHP 
(Republican People's Party); Şevket Kazan, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the RP (Welfare Party); 
Rıza Müftüoğlu, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the MHP (Nationalist Action Party), as well as Hasan 
Çağlayan, Director of Press and Information of the DYP (True Path Party) Headquarters, Faruk Abdüllahoğlu 
from the RP Headquarters, and Avni Çarsancaklı from the ANAP (Motherland Party) Headquarters, kindly 
accepted interviews with the author while he was preparing for the questionnaire text. The author owes special 
thanks to the late Assoc. Prof. Dr. Cahit Emre of Ankara University, who helped greatly with the questionnaire 
follow-ups, and İsmail Gündüz of the Ministry of Interior, who corrected the author’s Turkish in the 
questionnaire draft. The author also acknowledges the priceless opportunity for documentation work at the 
Library of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which has been provided by its General Director Ali Rıza 
Cihan and other members of the library including Sevgi Korkut, Şahin Akdağ, and Nafiz Ertürk. 
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politics2. Second, as in other non-Western democracies, it is the service and allocational aspects of 
responsiveness that compose the most frequent demands of constituents to parliamentarians in 
Turkey (Kim et al. 1984: 95, Kalaycıoğlu 1986: 322, Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 48-54, Keleş et al. 1993: 37). 
[4] Third, on the other hand, however, there is conflicting evidence about what priority Turkish 
parliamentarians give to constituency service. Authors (Kim et al. 1984) in the latter half of the 1970s 
found out that Turkish parliamentarians, unlike other non-Western counterparts, spent less time for 
constituency service than for those activities directly or indirectly related to legislation. Out of 101 
Turkish parliamentarians who were asked about the first most frequent activity, 39 responded 
‘explaining policies to voters’ and 30 responded ‘proposing, debating, and amending bills’. 
Responses related to constituency service included only 22 for ‘interceding with civil servants on 
constituents behalf’ and 7 for ‘obtaining government resources for my district’ (Kim et al. 1984: 73). 
However, Kalaycıoğlu in his 1984 and 1988 surveys, found out that, parliamentarians on average 
spent as much as half of their time listening to demands from constituents (Kalaycıoğlu 1995: 48-
54)3. The difference in time spent for constituency service may have emerged partly because 
Kalaycıoğlu's field surveys were conducted shortly after the transition from the military to the civilian 
government in December 1983. Legislative activities were novel to most of the newly elected 
parliamentarians, since then the politicians were banned from politics until 1987. It is necessary 
therefore to recast the issue in present light.  
[5] The rest of the paper consists of research design, results, and conclusions sections. After 
the data and the analytical methods are explained in the research design section, the results section 
investigates 1) the time allocated for constituency service among the total activities of the average 
parliamentarian, 2) motives for constituency service, 3) politico-economic variables determining the 
demand and supply of constituency service in each constituency. The conclusions section 
summarizes the major findings and discusses their implications. 
                                                 
2 For constituency size, see infra [22]. Another possible source of personal votes is the preferential voting 
system, which allows electorates to choose from the candidates on the same party list. The system was 
introduced just before the 1991 general election although it had been written in the 1983 electoral law. A 
provisional article of the law prevented the system from being applied to the 1983 general election. The law for 
the 1987 general election also chose not to put the preferential voting system into effect. Even after the first 
implementation of the system in the 1991 general election, however, it does not seem to have been 
institutionalized. In the following general elections from 1995 to 2002, the preferential voting system was again 
not used.  
3 His 1984 survey was originally reported in Kalaycıoğlu (1986). 
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I Research design 
[6] The questionnaire text was written in Turkish by the author and then shown in August 
1994 to leading members of the major political parties4 and to high-ranking bureaucrats for comment. 
After being revised, the text was finally checked by a high-ranking bureaucrat. The questionnaire was 
mainly composed of seven-point Likert scale indexes while including a few multiple-choice questions. 
If the respondent did not find any of the given scales or alternatives appropriate, he/she could choose 
‘other’ and could write down his/her answer. 
[7] The questionnaire survey was conducted in Ankara between June and October 1995. 
This was the time when Turkey was experiencing the first coalition government - bringing together 
the center-right DYP (True Path Party) and the center-left SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party) - 
after the 1980 military intervention. The parliamentarians were elected in October 1991 for the 19th 
legislative period of the unicameral Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM). While the Turkish 
legislative period is defined as five years, early general elections were held in December 1995. 
During the questionnaire survey, however, neither the government nor Parliament had decided to call 
early elections. Both the 1995 and 1999 general elections resulted in a fragmented parliament. The 
period of coalition governments lasted until the pro-Islamic AKP (Justice and Development Party) 
won the November 2002 general election to form a single-party government.  
[8] The 1983 electoral law (Law No. 2839) provides the basic frame for the present electoral 
system in Turkey. Applied first in the 1983 transition election, the law reflected the 1982 constitutional 
regime and brought about change from the abolished 1961 electoral law. First, the law set two 
hurdles to eliminate minor parties. One was the requirement of gaining 10% of the total national votes 
to obtain seats in the parliament. The party could not have the right to seats unless it cleared the 
national 10% minimum requirement. The other was the same constituency minimum requirement as 
was used from 1961 to 1965. Second, less importantly, the districting system was changed so that 
rural provinces would be more over-represented relative to urban provinces. One seat was allocated 
to each province without regard for population size, and then the remaining seats were allocated in 
                                                 
4 They include Ercan Karakaş, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the SHP (Social Democratic Populist 
Party); İstemihan Talay, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the CHP (Republican People's Party); Şevket 
Kazan, Parliamentary Group Vice Chairman of the Refah Party (Welfare Party); Rıza Müftüoğlu, Parliamentary 
Group Vice Chairman of the MHP (Nationalist Action Party), as well as Hasan Çağlayan, Director of Press and 
Information of the DYP (True Path Party) Headquarters, Faruk Abdüllahoğlu from the Refah Party (Welfare 
Party) Headquarters, and Avni Çarsancaklı from the ANAP (Motherland Party) Headquarters. 
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proportion to the population, with at least one seat to each province. If the province was entitled to 
more than seven seats, then the provinces were divided into plural constituencies that had no less 
than three seats.  
[9] Even after the transition to the civilian government, the incumbent’s meddling with the 
electoral system for political expediencies continued. Prior to the 1987 general election, ‘contingency 
seats’ were introduced for the provinces that had plural four, five, or six-member constituencies. In 
these constituencies, one contingency seat was to be allocated to the first party in the constituency. 
Incumbent ANAP thus tried to and actually did secure the majority in the face of declining popularity. 
Prior to the 1995 general election, the incumbent as well as other mainstream parties apparently 
feared that the emerging pro-Islamic party might gain the parliamentary majority. As a result of 
amendments on the electoral law and of their repeals, 1) the constituency minimum requirement was 
lifted, 2) the contingency seats were abolished, and 3) the ceiling on constituency size was raised to 
18 from previous six so that the system became more proportional in effect. This system remains 
valid to this day5. 
[10] The questionnaire was mailed in June 1995 to 430 parliamentarians, which equaled the 
total 450 members of parliament minus those who had passed away and minus those who had been 
expelled from Parliament including the DEP (Democracy Party) members6. The parliamentarians 
were asked to send the fulfilled questionnaire to the researcher in the enclosed envelope. Follow-up 
work was done in October 1995 to remind by phone the parliamentarians and/or their secretaries of 
the questionnaire. Since the data was not collected by interview, it was not possible to verify the 
answers given in the questionnaire sheet. The data therefore cannot be interpreted as purely 
descriptive. There were 85 respondents, i.e. a 19.8 % response ratio7, consisting of 42 members in 
governing parties, 42 in opposition, and one member whose party was unknown (Table 1).  
 
                                                 
5 For the vicissitude of Turkey’s electoral system, see Tuncer (2003) and Sabuncu and Şeker (1996). 
6 DEP members were arrested and lost their parliamentary seats after Parliament lifted their immunity in March 
1994 because of the leader's statement sympathetic to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). 
7 This response ratio is not much low for this kind of mail questionnaire. 
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Table 1: Respondents by Party and Ministerial Experience 
Party in Ministerial experience in the 







Government Subtotal 42 50.0 233 52.6 
 ‘Yes’ 14 16.7  79 17.8 
 ‘No’ 27 32.1 154 34.8 
 No answer  1  1.2 － － 
Opposition  42 50.0 210 47.4 
Subtotal  84 100.0 443 100.0 
No answer   1 － － － 
Total  85 － 443 － 
Sources: Compiled by the author from TBMM Albümü, 19. Dönem, 1. Baskı, 1992, Ankara, 1992 for 
the party distribution of the parliamentary seats and from Sanal (1995: 219-223) for the ministerial 
experience of parliamentarians. 
 
[11] Out of the 42 respondents from governing parties, 14 had experienced ministerial posts 
and 27 had not while the remaining one did not answer the relevant question. Despite the small 
response ratio, the sample distribution of parliamentarians by party and ministerial experience are 
considerably similar to the population distributions, except for the Eastern region due to the expulsion 
of DEP parliamentarians. The sample parliamentarians by region (Table 3) are also distributed in 
much the same manner as the population parliamentarians, with a single exception in the Southeast 
region. Data was then put into the non-parametric statistical analysis since nominal and ordinal 
scales used in the questionnaire did not allow the normal-distribution assumption on the population. 
 
                                                 
8 Percentages to the subtotal of the government and opposition members. 
9 The calculation of the number of those with ministerial experience in the 19th legislative period required us to 
use the earliest data available, as of 1 March 1992, in the first edition of the TBMM album for the 19th 
legislative period. 
Citation: Hazama, Yasushi (2005) 'Constituency service in Turkey: a survey on MPs', European Journal of Turkish 
Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, URL: http://www.ejts.org/document471.html 
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§) 
Table 2: Respondents by Region 
Region Sample Population10 
 N (%)11 N (%) 
West 29 36.7 131 30.5 
South 12 15.2 60 14.0 
Central 21 26.6 107 24.9 
North 8 10.1 45 10.5 
East 9 11.4 87 20.2 
Subtotal 79 100.0 430 100.0 
No answer 6 － － － 
Total 85 － 430 － 
Source: Compiled by the author from TBMM Albümü, 19. Dönem, 1. Baskı, 1992, Ankara, 1992. 
 
II Results 
[12] From the results of the questionnaire survey, this section reveals 1) various kinds of 
constituency service and its proportion to the total activities of parliamentarians, 2) parliamentarians’ 
motives for engaging in constituency service, and 3) political and economic variables that affect the 
demand for and the supply of constituency service.  
 
Constituency service: what and how much? 
 
Time allocations 
[13] Within the time at their own disposal, parliamentarians were busier with meeting 
constituents than with legislative activities. Table 3 shows that the two largest shares of their time 
were spent either in the General Assembly or in party group meetings. These activities, however, are 
almost obligations as parliamentarians or as party members. Then what came next was ‘visiting the 
constituency’, followed by ‘meeting constituents for their personal problems’ if we exclude another 
such obligatory activity as ‘participating in parliamentary committee meetings’. As a result, 
parliamentarians allocated very limited time to preparing bills and questions12. 
                                                 
10 The population, 430 parliamentarians, are the residual of the total 450 members of parliament minus those 
who had passed away and minus those who had been expelled from Parliament. I mailed the questionnaire to 
these 430 parliamentarians in June 1995. 
11 Percentages to the subtotal of the five regions. 
12 Kim et al. (1984)'s multiple questions included ‘proposing, debating, and amending bills’ whereas the 
questionnaire separately treated, on the one hand, participating in parliamentary or party meetings, and on the 
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Table 3: Time Spent Annually for Each Activity13 
Activities Index14 mean 
Obligatory  
Participating in the General Assembly 6.06 
Participating in parliamentary group meetings 5.96 
Participating in the parliamentary committee 5.32 
Voluntary  
Visiting the constituency 5.35 
Meeting constituents for their personal problems 5.19 
Preparing bills 3.13 
Preparing written and oral questions 3.08 
Source: the author’s questionnaire survey.  
 
Demands and solutions 
[14] The frequency of demand from constituents was closely related to the possibility that 
parliamentarians will find any form of solution to their problems (Table 6). Spearman’s rhos between 
the demands brought and demands solved ranged from .311 to .590. It is either because 
parliamentarians tried to solve those problems that they were most frequently asked to or because 
constituents brought to parliamentarians those problems which could be possibly solved by 
parliamentarians, or because of both reasons. The results also show that parliamentarians were 
more capable in allocation responsiveness than in service and policy responsiveness. 
Parliamentarians were thus more responsive to such demands as job-creating investments in the 
constituency (ρ=.590) and infrastructural services of the constituency (ρ=.554) than to those 
demands related to constituents' personal problems (ρ=.321), complaints of the local government 
(ρ=.425), complaints to the central government (ρ=.311), and legislative activities (ρ=.448).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                       
other, preparing bills and questions. By doing so I distinguished (almost) obligatory legislative activities from 
voluntary ones.  
13 Question: ‘How much time do you spend in a year for the following duties? For each item, please mark the 
appropriate number on the scale.’ 
14 From 1 (=Least) to 7 (=Most). There were no adjectives for 2 to 6. 
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Table 4: Frequency of Demands from Constituents15 
Demands Index16 Brought (A) Index Solved 
(B) 
Spearman’s rho for 
(A) and (B)17 
Their personal problems 5.92 3.71 .321 
Infrastructural services18 of the 
constituency 
4.79 4.06 .554 
Complaints to the central 
government 
4.51 3.25 .311 
Job-creating investment in the 
constituency 
4.14 3.10 .590 
Complaints of the local 
government 
3.56 3.12 .425 
Legislative activity 2.43 3.49 .448 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey.  
 
Motives: why? 
[15] What are some of the most important motives behind constituency service that take up 
much of parliamentarians' time of their own disposal? This study assumes that parliamentarians are 
motivated for constituency service by their primary objective of reelection. It will be possible to 
analyze the clearer relationship between constituency service and re-electoral motives by dividing the 
reelection process into the party-list nomination stage and the election stage. This section also sheds 
light on the role of media that publicize parliamentarians’ constituency service activities. 
 
Party list nomination 
[16] In all parties but the social democratic CHP (Republican People’s Party), it is the party 
leader and/or the party central committee that decides on the ranking of candidates on the party list. 
                                                 
15 Question for A: ‘How much part do the following items form of the total demand of the constituents who 
come to meet you? For each item, please mark the appropriate number on the scale’. Question for B: ‘How 
much part of the following items for which the constituents wanted to meet you comes to a solution? For each 
item, please mark the appropriate number on the scale.’ 
16 From 1 (=Least) to 7 (=Most). There were no adjectives for 2 to 6. Entries are index means. 
17 Spearman's rank-sum correlation coefficients (rhos), all of which are statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
(the level of statistical significance, or the p value, shows the reliability of the correlation coefficient). 
Coefficients greater than .50 in value are in bold face. 
18 Such as roads, water, and electricity. 
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Kalaycıoğlu (1995: 46) argued that ‘the political party leaderships always try to balance the local 
popularity against the personal loyalty of the candidates to the party leader’. 
[17] Table 5 shows, however, that the balance is tilted slightly in favor of popularity against 
loyalty, according to parliamentarians’ perception. Parliamentarians regarded ‘support from the party 
rank and file’ as the most important variable for being nominated in the party list. ‘Support from the 
party executive’ came second in importance. The third and fourth most important variables (‘securing 
investment and public services to the constituency’ and ‘meeting constituents to cope with their 
demands’) were both related to constituency service. 
 





Support from the party rank and file X 5.67 
Support from the party executive  5.27 
Securing investment and public services to the 
constituency 
X 4.78 
Meeting constituents to cope with their demands X 4.71 
One's legislative activities  4.34 
Speaking to or writing an article for the press  3.87 
Asking written and oral questions  3.21 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey. 
 
Election 
[18] Among variables affecting election (Table 6) that follows the party list nomination, 
parliamentarians regarded support to the party from public opinion as the first most important. Public 
support to the party, however, was beyond the control of individual parliamentarians. The second and 
the third most important variables were related to constituency service, namely, ‘securing investment 
and public services to the constituency’ and ‘meeting constituents to cope with their demands’. These 
variables involved efforts mostly achievable by individual parliamentarians. Thus, among variables 
within the reach of individual parliamentarians, constituency service was regarded as having the 
largest effect on the reelection of each parliamentarian. 
                                                 
19 Question: ‘For entering the first rows of the party electoral list, how important are the following efforts? For 
each item, please mark the appropriate number on the scale.’ 
20 From 1 (=Least) to 7 (=Most). There were no adjectives for 2 to 6. 
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Table 6: Variables Affecting MPs in Election21 
Variables Constituency service relevant Index22 mean 
Support to the party from public opinion  5.96 
Securing investment and public services to the 
constituency 
X 5.16 
Meeting constituents to cope with their demands X 5.15 
Party members working for election  4.84 
One's legislative activities  4.55 
Speaking to or writing an article for the press  4.51 
Asking written and oral questions  2.99 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey. 
 
The media 
[19] In order to link constituency service to reelection, parliamentarians have to publicize their 
constituency service activities to their constituents. How do parliamentarians tell their constituents 
that it was them who have helped to bring some of the investments and public services to the 
constituency? Will it be rewarding to spend a significant part of their time for meeting constituents to 
cope with their demands although those people whom parliamentarians can meet in person 
constitute only a negligent proportion of the total constituents?  
 
Table 7: The Media by which Constituents Learn Their MPs' Activities23 
Types of media Index24 mean Circulation 
Constituents who have met MPs 5.24 Local 
Party organizations 4.83 Local 
Local newspapers 4.52 Local 
Television 4.22 National 
National newspapers 3.58 National 
Pamphlets 3.50 Local 
Radio 2.98 National 
Magazines 2.84 National 
Source: The author’s questionnaire survey. 
                                                 
21 Question: ‘For being reelected in the general election, how important are the following efforts, apart from 
entering the first rows of the party electoral list? For each item, please mark the appropriate number on the 
scale.’ 
22 From 1 (=Least) to 7 (=Most). There were no adjectives for 2 to 6. 
23 Question: ‘From the following communication media items, to what extent do constituents learn of your 
activities? For each item, please mark the appropriate number on the scale.’ 
24 From 1 (=Least) to 7 (=Most). There were no adjectives for 2 to 6. 
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[20] This study contends that parliamentarians expect various forms of media to publicize 
their activities. The media can be broadly grouped into local and national ones in terms of their areas 
of dissemination and impact. The local media were perceived generally to be more important than the 
national ones. In particular, constituents who had met parliamentarians were regarded as the most 
important among not only local but all forms of media. Parliamentarians may have expected 
constituents who have met them to let other constituents know their activities. In other words, the 
effort for parliamentarians to cope with constituents’ personal demands can pay off if such contacts 
will have spill-over effects on parliamentarians’ publicity. 
 
Explaining variances in services: size, economic development, and incumbency 
[21] The preceding analysis showed that Turkish parliamentarians in general perceived 
constituency service to be critical for reelection and acted accordingly. The question remains, 
however, whether this is a ubiquitous phenomenon in Turkey. In other words, it is possible to expect 
the political and economic structures of the constituency to affect the amount, as well as the salience 
of constituency service. Some structural characteristics of the constituency may more strongly 
predispose constituents to demand constituency service while other characteristics will make 
parliamentarians take constituency service more seriously. This paper hypothesizes that at least 
three structural variables (two being political and the other being economic) are particularly important: 




[22] Constituency size may well influence the supply of constituency service. In Turkey’s 
proportional representation system, the number of seats in each constituency ranged from two to six 
for the 19th TBMM. In terms of reelection, the smaller the number of seats in the constituency, the 
more important will be the personal appeals of the candidates. Conversely, the larger the number of 
the seats the more important will be the popularity of the parties of the candidates. It can be 
hypothesized therefore that parliamentarians from small constituencies are more motivated for and 
more involved in constituency service than are parliamentarians from large constituencies.  
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[23] Constituency size may well reflect other features of constituency environments such as 
socioeconomic development and cultural values. For instance, constituency size was moderately 
correlated with the constituency’s level of economic development, measured by the per capita 
income for 1993 of the province25 in which the constituency was located (Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient = .301, p = .02). In the following, the partial correlation analysis was therefore adopted to 
control the effect of socioeconomic development on constituency size and vice versa.  
[24] The ‘supply’ part of Table 8 seems to support the above hypothesis. Constituency size, 
when the per capita income effect was controlled for, was negatively correlated with all indicators of 
the supply (composed of motives and practice) of constituency service. The smaller the constituency 
size was, the more importance did parliamentarians attach to constituency service. Relatedly, the 
smaller the constituency size was, the greater part of their time did parliamentarians spend for 




                                                 
25 A province (il) in the Turkish political system refers to the whole geographical area covering not only the 
central district (merkez ilçesi) but all the other districts (ilçeler) that fall within the provincial boundary. 
Citation: Hazama, Yasushi (2005) 'Constituency service in Turkey: a survey on MPs', European Journal of Turkish 
Studies, Thematic Issue N°3, Being a MP in contemporary Turkey, URL: http://www.ejts.org/document471.html 
To quote a passage, use paragraph (§) 
Table 8: Partial Correlation of Constituency Features with Service26 
Constituency service Constituency features 
(controlled effect)  –
Constituency size (1991)27 
Constituency features 
(controlled effect)  –Per capita 
income (1993)28 
Supply – Motives：Perceived importance for 
election29/Meeting constituents to cope with their 
demands 
-.253** .074 
Supply – Motives：Perceived importance for 
election/Securing investment and public services 
to the constituency 
-.218* -.025 
Supply – Practice：Time spent30/Meeting 
constituents for their personal problems 
-.255** -.123 
Supply – Practice：Time spent/Visiting the 
constituency 
-.226* -.234* 
Demand – Visitors31 -.126 -.137 
Demand – Letters & faxes32 .127 -.139 
Demand – Telephone calls33 -.273** -.283** 
Sources: For constituency service, the author’s questionnaire survey. For constituency size, see 
Appendix 1. For per capita incomes, see Appendix 2. 
 
                                                 
26 Entries are Spearman's partial correlation coefficients. I have adopted the partial correlation analysis since 
constituency size and per capita constituency incomes are moderately correlated (Spearman’s partial 
correlation coefficient = .301, p = .02). Question: ‘While the parliament is in session, with how many 
constituents per week do you meet in Ankara or in your constituency?’. Answers: a=less than 100, b=100-199, 
c=200-299, d=300-399, e=400-499, f=500-599, g= 600–699, h=700-799, i=800-899, j=900–999, k=1,000 or 
more. Question: ’While the parliament is in session, how many letters or fax messages arrive from constituents 
per day?’Answers: a= 1-10, b= 11-20, c= 21-30, d= 31-40, e= 41-50, f= 51-75, g= 76-100, h= 101-150, i= 151-
200, j= 200 or more. Question: ‘While the parliament is in session, how many telephone calls do you receive 
from your constituents per day?’ Answers: a= 1-20, b= 21-40, c= 41-60, d= 61-80, e= 81-100, f= 101-150, g= 
151-200, h= 201-300, j= 300 or more. *p<.10.**p<.05. 
27 The effect of per capita income is controlled. 
28 The effect of constituency size is controlled. The year 1993 falls in the middle between the first year of the 
19th legislative period, 1991 and the year in which the questionnaire survey was conducted, 1995. Per capita 
constituency incomes were approximated by the per capita income of the province in which the constituency 
was located. At the time of the 1991 general election out of the total 74 provinces, 54 had single 
constituencies. It means that in nearly two-thirds of the provinces, constituency incomes are equal to provincial 
incomes. The most populated Istanbul Province, however, has nine constituencies. 
29 See Table 6. 
30 See Table 6. 
31 Per week, either in Ankara or in the constituency (median= ‘200-299’). 
32 Per day (median= ‘11-20’). 
33 Per day (median= ‘21-40’). 
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[25] Constituency size may also affect demands for constituency service. For small 
constituency makes it easier for constituents to recognize their representatives. The ‘demand’ part of 
table 8 shows that constituency size was negatively correlated with the number of telephone calls 
from constituents although not with the other two demand-related variables that were more costly for 
constituents and whose cost varied across constituencies at different levels of development and 
distance to the capital. The recognition of parliamentarians seems to enhance the likelihood of a 
constituent making a phone call but not that of his or her writing a letter or paying a visit to Ankara, 
where MPs usually stay.  
 
The level of economic development  
[26] The level of economic development may be closely related to demands for constituency 
service. It will be recalled that major demands for constituency service included jobs, infrastructure, 
and investment. If the constituency is economically less developed, these demands will be naturally 
higher there than in economically more developed constituencies. The ‘demand’ part of Table 8 
shows that the per capita constituency income, after the constituency size effect has been controlled, 
was negatively correlated with the number of telephone calls, which was the cheapest and the 
easiest way to express constituents’ demands to their representatives34.  Per capita income, on the 
other hand, was not correlated with any supply variables of constituency service except for 
parliamentarians’ ‘time spent for visiting the constituency’35. Thus, a lower level of economic 
development will make more people ask for constituency service but it will probably not directly 
increase the importance of personal votes. 
 
                                                 
34 The level of economic development was not correlated with either the number of letters and faxes or the 
number of visitors at a statistically significant level. It can only be speculated that the low literary rates in less 
developed constituencies make it difficult for the constituents to write letters or fax messages to their 
representatives while high transportation costs and bad traffic access may be hindering visits to Ankara from 
less developed constituencies. These positive relationships between the level of economic development and 
the difficulties in scriptural communication or journey may have cancelled out the potentially negative 
relationship between the level of economic development and the intensity of demands.  
35 In other words, parliamentarians from economically less developed constituencies spend more time visiting 
their constituencies than other parliamentarians. It is plausible that they are not so much willing as forced to 
spend a lot of time to visit those constituencies with poor traffic access. 
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Previous incumbency 
[27] In his article on constituency service in Britain, Norton (1990) argued that new 
parliamentarians, who were less secure than others in the following election, might spend a larger 
part of their time for constituency service than others do. He found between two successive elections 
a larger number of incremental votes cast for the more recently elected parliamentarians than for 
others. This led him to believe that new parliamentarians had provided more constituency service 
than older incumbents had.  
[28] The Wilcoxon test applied to the data for the current study showed, however, that in 
Turkey newly elected parliamentarians did not necessarily provide more constituency service than 
reelected parliamentarians did. Between the newly elected parliamentarians and the reelected 
parliamentarians there were not any statistically significant differences in the medians of constituency 
service indices (see Table 3), i. e., ‘visiting the constituency’ (p = .56) and ‘meeting constituents for 
their personal problems’ (p = .52). 
[29] This result is largely due to the difference between the system of single-member 
constituency in Britain and that of plural-member constituency in Turkey. In a plural-member 
constituency any incumbent, though holding competitive advantages over new candidates in the 
constituency, has to compete, first, with other incumbents from his own party for a higher rank in the 
party list. This competition will be more intense when his party has done well in the preceding 
election thus producing a larger number of incumbents from his party in the constituency. Second, 
even if he has secured a higher position in the party list, he must compete with other incumbents 
from other parties. To be a single incumbent in the constituency from his party, though opening 
access to the highest rank in the party list, will narrow his chances in the struggle with incumbents 
from other parties. In brief, being an incumbent provides less security for reelection in a plural-
member constituency than in a single-member constituency.  
[30] There is supporting evidence from the analysis of effects of constituency size in a similar 
case. Reed (1994: 285) found that in Japan, where the electorate cast a single-non-transferable vote 
in the plural-member (ranging from three to five members) district, the incumbency effect was 
stronger in smaller constituencies than in larger ones. In three-member districts 52% of the districts 
have reelected all their incumbents since 1972 whereas in four-member and five-member districts the 
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rate was 43% and 34% respectively. The larger the constituency size, the more marginal became the 
incumbent edge. 
 
Table 9: Turnover Rates: Lower Houses of National Legislatures 
Country36 Turnover rate37 
(%) 
Period38 
New Zealand 10.4 1946-92 
United States1978-9 14.9 1978-92 
Japan 15.0 1972-90 
Germany 26.039 1953-87 
France 30.040 1946-93 
Israel* 40.2 1951-9241 
Turkey* 70.2 1991 
Source: Calculated by the author from the data in Somiet et al. (1994).  
 
[31] In addition, in Turkey the legislative turnover rate is particularly high, being 70.2% 
(316/450) in 1991 (Table 9). This rate contrasts with 10.4 % of the members of the New Zealand 
House of Representatives, 14.9 % of the United States Members of Congress, 15% of the Japanese 
Diet members, 26.0 % of the CDU Bundestag members in Germany, 30% of the French Assemblée 
Nationale members, and even 40.2 % of the Israeli Knesset members who compete in the single 
nationwide constituency. This may be partly because the 1982 Constitution prohibited politicians at 
the time of the 1980 military intervention from political activity for five to ten years. Before this political 
ban was eventually abolished by constitutional amendment in 1987, many former politicians had 
either chosen to retire or found their political base taken over by post-1980 politicians recruited from 
the bureaucracy or business. Thus there remained very few experienced parliamentarians in post-
1980 Turkey. 
 
                                                 
36 Countries with an asterisk (*) have a unicameral legislature. 
37 Period average. 
38 Starting and ending with general election-years. 
39 Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Bundestag members. The same rate was 24.5 % for German Social 
Democratic Party (SPD) Bundestag members. Both figures exclude Berlin representatives. 
40 Excluding parliamentarians who died in office or resigned. 
41 Excluding the very early general election of 1961. 
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Conclusions 
[32] This paper explored some causes and consequences of constituency service in a 
proportional representational system. Turkey provides an interesting case here. First, its province-
size constituencies generate a significant size of personal votes for a candidate, though nominated in 
the party list.  Second, as in other non-Western democracies, it is the service and allocational 
aspects of responsiveness that compose the most frequent demands of constituents to 
parliamentarians in Turkey. There exists, however, conflicting evidence regarding what priority 
Turkish parliamentarians give to constituency service. It will be important to know how and to what 
extent parliamentarians are responding to demands from constituents as well as why they do so.   
[33] The analysis of the data collected through a questionnaire survey illuminated three 
features of constituency service in Turkey. First, in terms of daily activities, parliamentarians spend 
for constituency service the largest part of their time at their own disposal. This finding falls in 
between Kim et al.’s survey (1984), conducted in the latter half of the 1970s and Kalaycıoğlu’s 
surveys (1995), conducted in 1984 and 1988. The present Turkish parliament, after the 1980-83 
interlude by military rule, has probably come to revert to that of the 1970s which consisted of many 
representatives with legislative experience.  
[34] Second, for the purpose of reelection, parliamentarians consider their individual activities 
to be almost as important as the party popularity. Those activities are publicized through the local 
media, including the press, the most important of which, however, being the constituents that they 
meet in person.  
[35] Third, the demand for and supply of constituency service depend on different politico-
economic structures of the constituency. The smaller the constituency size, the larger will be the 
demand for and the supply of constituency service. This is because in small constituencies 
parliamentarians are more recognizable by their constituents and the weight of personal votes is 
larger than in large constituencies. The economically less developed constituencies tend to generate 
more demand than the more developed constituencies but do not significantly motivate the 
parliamentarians to provide constituency service. 
[36] Thus, even under proportional representation, relatively small constituencies in Turkey 
render constituency service important for parliamentarians seeking reelection. In addition, the Turkish 
parliamentarian’s turnover rate is much higher than turnover rates for parliamentarians in other 
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democratic countries. Even reelected parliamentarians therefore will have to take constituency 
service seriously. The statistical test showed no significant difference in the practices of constituency 
service between newly-elected and reelected parliamentarians. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Constituencies for the 1991 general election 
Province N Province Name Constituency No. Constituency Seats 
1 Adana 1 6 
1 Adana 2 3 
1 Adana 3 5 
2 Adıyaman 1 4 
3 Afyon 1 6 
4 Ağrı 1 4 
5 Amasya 1 3 
6 Ankara 1 6 
6 Ankara 2 6 
6 Ankara 3 6 
6 Ankara 4 5 
7 Antalya 1 6 
7 Antalya 2 3 
8 Artvin 1 2 
9 Aydın 1 6 
10 Balıkesir 1 4 
10 Balıkesir 2 3 
11 Bilecik 1 2 
12 Bingöl 1 3 
13 Bitlis 1 3 
14 Bolu 1 5 
15 Burdur 1 3 
16 Bursa 1 6 
16 Bursa 2 6 
17 Çanakkale 1 4 
18 Çankırı 1 3 
19 Çorum 1 5 
20 Denizli 1 6 
21 Diyarbakır 1 5 
21 Diyarbakır 2 3 
22 Edirne 1 4 
23 Elazığ 1 4 
24 Erzincan 1 3 
25 Erzurum 1 4 
25 Erzurum 2 3 
26 Eskişehir 1 5 
27 Gaziantep 1 6 
27 Gaziantep 2 3 
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28 Giresun 1 4 
29 Gümüşhane 1 2 
30 Hakkari 1 2 
31 Hatay 1 5 
31 Hatay 2 3 
32 Isparta 1 4 
33 Içel 1 6 
33 Içel 2 3 
34 Istanbul 1 6 
34 Istanbul 2 6 
34 Istanbul 3 6 
34 Istanbul 4 6 
34 Istanbul 5 6 
34 Istanbul 6 6 
34 Istanbul 7 6 
34 Istanbul 8 5 
34 Istanbul 9 3 
35 Izmir 1 6 
35 Izmir 2 6 
35 Izmir 3 4 
35 Izmir 4 3 
36 Kars 1 5 
37 Kastamonu 1 4 
38 Kayseri 1 4 
38 Kayseri 2 3 
39 Kırklareli 1 3 
40 Kırşehir 1 3 
41 Kocaeli 1 4 
41 Kocaeli 2 3 
42 Konya 1 6 
42 Konya 2 4 
42 Konya 3 3 
43 Kütahya 1 5 
44 Malatya 1 6 
45 Manisa 1 6 
45 Manisa 2 3 
46 Kahramanmaraş 1 4 
46 Kahramanmaraş 2 3 
47 Mardin 1 5 
48 Muğla 1 5 
49 Muş 1 3 
50 Nevşehir 1 3 
51 Niğde 1 3 
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52 Ordu 1 6 
53 Rize 1 3 
54 Sakarya 1 6 
55 Samsun 1 6 
55 Samsun 2 3 
56 Siirt 1 3 
57 Sinop 1 3 
58 Sivas 1 6 
59 Tekirdağ 1 4 
60 Tokat 1 6 
61 Trabzon 1 6 
62 Tunceli 1 2 
63 Şanlıurfa 1 5 
63 Şanlıurfa 2 3 
64 Uşak 1 3 
65 Van 1 5 
66 Yozgat 1 5 
67 Zonguldak 1 4 
67 Zonguldak 2 3 
68 Aksaray 1 3 
69 Bayburt 1 2 
70 Karaman 1 2 
71 Kırıkkale 1 3 
72 Batman 1 3 
73 Sirnak 1 3 
74 Bartın 1 2 
Total - - 450 
Source: State Institute of Statistics(1992). 
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Appendix 2: Per capita provincial income in 1993 
Province No Province Name Per capita income in 
1993 (TL at 1987 
prices) 
1  Adana 1560940  
2  Adıyaman 1064153  
3  Afyon 889549  
4  Ağrı 296990  
5  Amasya 977149  
6  Ankara 2251196  
7  Antalya 1740647  
8  Artvin 1763629  
9  Aydın 1698122  
10  Balıkesir 1540695  
11  Bilecik 2508682  
12  Bingol 365579  
13  Bitlis 439713  
14  Bolu 1614151  
15  Burdur 1324673  
16  Bursa 2356180  
17  Çanakkale 2044309  
18  Çankırı 756539  
19  Çorum 1230741  
20  Denizli 1620637  
21  Diyarbakır 1074895  
22  Edirne 1359210  
23  Elazığ 1271147  
24  Erzincan 731540  
25  Erzurum 656647  
26  Eskişehir 1612345  
27  Gaziantep 1324697  
28  Giresun 781717  
29  Gümüşhane 612764  
30  Hakkari 300966  
31  Hatay 1444647  
32  Isparta 1030363  
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33  İçel 2084310  
34  İstanbul 2539805  
35  İzmir 2614320  
36  Kars 516588  
37  Kastamonu 1108650  
38  Kayseri 1116395  
39  Kırklareli 2308464  
40  Kırşehir 938757  
41  Kocaeli 4422665  
42  Konya 1138854  
43  Kütahya 1319759  
44  Malatya 1138317  
45  Manisa 2170312  
46  Kahramanmaraş 942882  
47  Mardin 698693  
48  Muğla 2015040  
49  Muş 361796  
50  Nevşehir 1720398  
51  Niğde 1174826  
52  Ordu 697467  
53  Rize 1247248  
54  Sakarya 1320462  
55  Samsun 1230829  
56  Siirt 732922  
57  Sinop 921038  
58  Sivas 834956  
59  Tekirdağ 2104988  
60  Tokat 963919  
61  Trabzon 1047306  
62  Tunceli 614273  
63  Şanlıurfa 708905  
64  Uşak 1092381  
65  Van 519622  
66  Yozgat 694058  
67  Zonguldak 1399660  
68  Aksaray 742698  
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69  Bayburt 516043  
70  Karaman 1696645  
71  Kırıkkale 1663582  
72  Batman 951359  
73  Şırnak 326248  
74  Bartın 566968  
Source: General Directorate of Regional Development and Structural Adjustment, State Planning 
Organization (1997).  
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